UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

12-4-2017

State v. Ritchie Appellant's Brief Dckt. 45175

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"State v. Ritchie Appellant's Brief Dckt. 45175" (2017). Not Reported. 4347.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/4347

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
NO. 45175
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-16-24285
v.
)
)
CHAD STUART RITCHIE,
)
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)
________________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA
________________________
HONORABLE MICHAEL REARDON
District Judge
________________________
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
MAYA P. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9582
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ........................................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ..................................................................................................... 1
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .......................................................................................... 5
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................................. 6
I. The District Court’s Jury Instruction And The Prosecutor’s Closing
Argument Regarding The Ways In Which Mr. Ritchie Committed
Grand Theft By Possession Of Stolen Property Created A Fatal
Variance With The Information ....................................................................................... 6
A. The Variance Deprived Mr. Ritchie Of His Unwaived
Right To Due Process ................................................................................................ 7
B. The Variance Plainly Exists In The Record ................................................................ 8
C. The Variance Was Not Harmless ............................................................................... 8
II. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced
Mr. Ritchie To Twenty Years, With Five Years Fixed, For
Grand Theft By Possession Of Stolen Property ................................................................ 9
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 11
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ................................................................................................. 12

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
State v. Alvarez, 138 Idaho 747 (Ct. App. 2003) ..........................................................................6
State v. Brazil, 136 Idaho 327 (Ct. App. 2001) ............................................................................6
State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476 (Ct. App. 2013) ...............................................................................6
State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327 (2011) .............................................................................................6
State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139 (2007) ........................................................................................6
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828 (2011) ..........................................................................................9
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010) ....................................................................................... 7, 8
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457 (2002)..........................................................................................9
State v. Sutton, 151 Idaho 161 (Ct. App. 2011) ............................................................................8
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565 (Ct. App. 1982)...........................................................................9
State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410 (1985) ................................................................................... 6, 8
Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299 (2010) .........................................6

Statutes
I.C. § 18-2403(4)..................................................................................................................... 7, 8

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Chad Ritchie challenges his conviction for grand theft by possession of stolen property.
Because the jury instruction and the prosecutor’s closing argument created a fatal variance with
the information, this Court should vacate Mr. Ritchie’s judgment of conviction and remand this
case to the district court for a new trial. Alternatively, this Court should reduce Mr. Ritchie’s
sentence because his unified term of twenty years, with five years fixed, is excessive in light of
the mitigating evidence in this case.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The police arrested Mr. Ritchie on August 5, 2016, after finding him with a stolen car. In
its information, the State alleged that Mr. Ritchie,
did knowingly possess stolen property, to-wit: 2004 Ford Taurus of a value in
excess of One Thousand Dollars, the property of Andrew Gauss, knowing the
property to have been stolen, or under circumstances as would reasonably induce
him/her to believe that the property was stolen, and with the intent to deprive the
owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property.
(R., pp.30–31 (emphasis added).)
Mr. Ritchie, who had decided to represent himself, took the case to trial. The State’s
witnesses included three police officers and the owner of the Ford Taurus. The State also
introduced a handful of exhibits, including the audio recordings of four calls made through the
Ada County Jail’s Telmate system (State’s Exs. 1A, 2A, 3A, 4A), transcripts of those audio
recordings (State’s Exs. 1B, 2B, 3B, 4B), and a video taken by Sergeant Schneider’s body
camera of his interaction with Mr. Ritchie after he was detained on August 5 (State’s Ex. 5).
Mr. Ritchie presented no evidence.
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Detective Thorndyke testified that he was involved in an investigation in which
Mr. Ritchie’s name came up. (Tr.,1 p.139, Ls.10–15.) He began “a deep dive” into Mr. Ritchie’s
life, which included reviewing his Facebook account and then any Telmate phone calls with
friends at the Ada County Jail.

(Tr., p.139, L.15–p.140, L.17.)

He began by looking at

Mr. Ritchie’s list of Facebook friends, found which of them were in custody, and then reviewed
those individuals’ call logs. (Tr., p.143, L.16–p.144, L.4.)
Detective Thorndyke explained that every inmate is assigned an inmate number, and all
of their calls are recorded and saved, including the time, date, the person called, and the length of
the call. (Tr., p.140, L.21–p.142, L.19.) Similarly, anyone speaking to an inmate has to register
their phone number by providing their name, address, date of birth, and the last four digits of
their social security number. (Tr., p.141, Ls.1–19.)
He found calls between a number registered to Mr. Ritchie and a Facebook friend of his,
who went by Ms. Doughty or Ms. Slack. (Tr., p.144, L.4–p.145, L.19.) Detective Thorndyke
testified that the man identified himself as “Chad,” the man’s voice was the same in all of the
calls, and that the person said he was living out of a stolen car. (Tr., p.145, L.17–p.146, L.6.)
From there, Detective Thorndyke got a list of recently-stolen cars and officers began looking for
those cars and Mr. Ritchie. (Tr., p.146, Ls.6–19.) One of those was a 2005 Ford Taurus
belonging to Mr. Gauss. (Tr., p.130, L.18–p.132, L.5.)
On August 5, 2016, about ten officers, including Officer Thorndyke, Sergeant Schneider,
and Officer Arthur, went to the Howard Johnson Hotel and spotted what they believed to be the
stolen Ford Taurus. (Tr., p.151, L.8–p.152, L.15.) After confirming they had the right car, they
watched Mr. Ritchie unlock the car and move things from a hotel room to the car. (Tr., p.152,
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Citations to the transcript refer to the volume containing the trial and sentencing hearing.
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L.17–p.153, L.11.) The officers then confronted and arrested Mr. Ritchie. (Tr., p.153, Ls.11–
15.)
After Mr. Gauss got his Ford Taurus back about six weeks after it was stolen, it was
assessed with a total of $1,400 worth of damage, and his insurance company paid for those
repairs rather than totaling the car. (Tr., p.132, L.6–p.133, L.7; see also Tr., p.181, L.23–p.184,
L.22.)
At the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury as follows:
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Grand Theft by Possession of Stolen
Property as charged in Count I, the state must prove:
1. On or about August 5, 2016
2. in the State of Idaho;
3. the defendant CHAD STUART RITCHIE, knowingly possessed a Ford
Taurus valued in excess of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00);
4. either knowing the property was stolen by another or under such
circumstances as would reasonably induce the defendant to believe the
property was stolen;
5. such property was in fact stolen; and
6. any of the following occurred:
(a) the defendant had the intent to deprive the owner permanently
of the use or benefit of the property, or
(b) the defendant knowingly used, concealed or abandoned the
property in such manner as to deprive the owner permanently of
the use or benefit of the property, or
(c) the defendant used, concealed, or abandoned the property
knowing that such use, concealment or abandonment would have
probably deprived the owner permanently of the use or benefit of
the property.
(R., p.232 (emphasis added).) At closing, the prosecutor told the jury that “the evidence supports
either a conclusion under subsection A or a conclusion under subsection B.” (Tr., p.206, L.19–
p.208, L.1.) The jury later returned a guilty verdict (R., p.211), and, at Mr. Ritchie’s request, the
court appointed an attorney to represent him at the sentencing hearing (Tr., p.218, Ls.9–13).
At sentencing, the State recommended a unified term of twenty years with five years
fixed (Tr., p.227, Ls.13–15), and defense counsel asked that the court retain jurisdiction with a
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sentence for eight years, with two years fixed (Tr., p.228, Ls.13–20). The court sentenced
Mr. Ritchie to a unified term of twenty years, with five years fixed (R., pp.247–49), and
Mr. Ritchie timely appealed (R., pp.253–55).
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ISSUES
I.

Is there a fatal variance in this case because the information specified that Mr. Ritchie
committed grand theft by possession of stolen property with only one mental state, while
the court instructed the jury that it could convict Mr. Ritchie if he had any of three mental
states and the prosecutor told the jury that it had proven Mr. Ritchie had two mental
states.

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing a unified term of twenty years, with
five years fixed, for grand theft by possession of stolen property?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court’s Jury Instruction And The Prosecutor’s Closing Argument Regarding The
Ways In Which Mr. Ritchie Committed Grand Theft By Possession Of Stolen Property Created
A Fatal Variance With The Information
“A trial court has the duty to properly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case
before it.” Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 313 (2010). “The
instructions to the jury must match the allegation in the charging document as to the means by
which a defendant is alleged to have committed the crime charged.” State v. Folk, 151 Idaho
327, 342 (2011) (citing State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 147 (2007)). If they do not, “there can
be a fatal variance between the jury instructions and the charging document.” Folk, 151 Idaho at
342; see also State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476, 479 (Ct. App. 2013).
A variance is fatal, thus violating due process and requiring reversal, if when it deprives
the defendant of his right to fair notice of the charge against which he must defend. State v.
Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 417–18 (1985); State v. Brazil, 136 Idaho 327, 329–30 (Ct. App. 2001).
The notice element asks “whether the record suggests the possibility that the defendant was
misled or embarrassed in the preparation or presentation of his or her defense.” Windsor,
110 Idaho at 418.
The existence of an impermissible variance is a question of law which this Court reviews
de novo. State v. Alvarez, 138 Idaho 747, 750 (Ct. App. 2003). If a variance exists, the Court
must then decide whether it rises to the level of prejudicial error requiring reversal of the
conviction. Brazil, 136 Idaho at 330. When the error was not objected to, the defendant must
show that the error: “(1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights;
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate
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record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and
(3) was not harmless.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010). To show the error was not
harmless, the defendant has “the burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility that the error
affected the outcome of the trial.” Id. at 226.
The district court’s jury instruction and the prosecutor’s closing argument regarding the
ways in which Mr. Ritchie committed grand theft by possession of stolen property created a fatal
variance with the information. That variance rises to the level of fundamental error because it
deprived Mr. Ritchie of notice and thus due process, is clear from the record, and there is a
reasonable probability that it affected the verdict.

This Court should therefore vacate

Mr. Ritchie’s conviction.

A.

The Variance Deprived Mr. Ritchie Of His Unwaived Right To Due Process
The district court’s jury instruction and the prosecutor’s closing argument created a fatal

variance with the information. According to I.C. § 18-2403(4),
A person commits theft when he knowingly receives, retains, conceals,
obtains control over, possesses, or disposes of stolen property, knowing the
property to have been stolen or under such circumstances as would reasonably
induce him to believe that the property was stolen, and
(a) Intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit
of the property; or
(b) Knowingly uses, conceals or abandons the property in such
manner as to deprive the owner permanently of such use or benefit; or
(c) Uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing such use,
concealment or abandonment probably will deprive the owner
permanently of such use or benefit.
The information alleged that Mr. Ritchie committed grand theft by possession of stolen property
under subsection (a) only, by acting “with the intent to deprive the owner permanently of the use
or benefit of the property.” (R., p.30–31; see also Tr., p.70, Ls.8–19.) The jury instruction,
however, provided that the jury could convict Mr. Ritchie of grand theft by receiving stolen
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property if it concluded that he acted with any of the states of mind set out in subsections
(a) through (c) of I.C. § 18-2403(4). (R., p.232.) Finally, the prosecutor told the jury at closing
that it had proven that Mr. Ritchie acted with the states of mind set out in subsections (a) and (b).
(Tr., p.206, L.19–p.208, L.1.)
The instruction allowing the jury to convict Mr. Ritchie under any three of the
subsections, combined with the prosecutor’s assertion at closing that Mr. Ritchie committed
grand theft by possession of stolen property under both subsections (a) or (b), created a fatal
variance with the information, which alleged that he had only the mental state set out in
subsection (a). This error deprived Mr. Ritchie of notice and thus due process. See Windsor,
110 Idaho at 418.

B.

The Variance Plainly Exists In The Record
The variance is clear from the information, jury instruction, and closing argument

(R., pp.10, 232; Tr., p.206, L.19–p.208, L.1), and it was surely not a tactical decision by
Mr. Ritchie, a pro se defendant, to not object, see Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. No “reasonable trial
strategist” would elect not to object to an invitation by the prosecutor to convict him for conduct
of which he had no notice.

See State v. Sutton, 151 Idaho 161, 167–68 (Ct. App. 2011)

(concluding that mere speculation that a defendant strategically failed to object was not sufficient
to find the error did not plainly exist).

C.

The Variance Was Not Harmless
Finally, there is a reasonable possibility that the variance affected the verdict. See Perry,

150 Idaho at 226. Even though the information alleged only that Mr. Ritchie committed grand
theft by possession of stolen property by intending to deprive the owner permanently of the use
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or benefit of the property, the prosecutor alleged at closing that Mr. Ritchie had committed the
crime both by intending to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property
and by knowingly using, concealing, or abandoning the property in such manner as to deprive
the owner permanently of such use or benefit. The jury was presented with evidence that could
go to prove both of these states of mind, and, of these two, the latter requires a lesser showing by
the State. It is thus impossible to know whether the jury convicted Mr. Ritchie for conduct for
which he was actually charged, and so there is a reasonable possibility that the variance affected
the verdict. This Court should vacate Mr. Ritchie’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Ritchie To Twenty Years, With
Five Years Fixed, For Grand Theft By Possession Of Stolen Property
When a defendant challenges his sentence as excessively harsh, this Court will conduct
an independent review of the record, taking into account “the nature of the offense, the character
of the offender, and the protection of the public interest.” State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834
(2011). The Court reviews the district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion,
which occurs if the district court imposed a sentence that is unreasonable, and thus excessive,
“under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002); State v.
Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” Miller, 151 Idaho at 834.

Mr. Ritchie’s

sentence is excessive in light of the mitigating evidence in this case, including his upbringing,
past sexual abuse, mental health concerns, addictions, accountability, and remorse.
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Mr. Ritchie had a difficult upbringing. His parents split when he was a baby, and he
bounced around the homes of his parents, his friends, and his paternal grandmother, and also
spent time living on the streets. (PSI, p.14.) A family friend sexually abused him between the
ages of five and ten, a trauma which he has yet to fully process and address. (PSI, p.15.)
Mr. Ritchie has been diagnosed with ADHD and depression. (PSI, p.17.) Just before he was
arrested for this crime, he was using marijuana and methamphetamine and was selling drugs to
finance his addiction. (PSI, pp.18, 301.) He has struggled with drug use for much of his adult
life, and understands he needs help to be able to stay sober. (PSI, p.178.)
Importantly, Mr. Ritchie recognizes how his drug use and mental health problems are
intertwined with his criminal activity, but has still taken accountability for his actions. He told
the court at sentencing,
I’ve got a really bad past. I made a lot of really bad decisions. And almost every
single one of those was a result of my drug use. I don’t mean that as an excuse,
but, I mean, they go hand in hand. When I’m clean, when I’m sober, I make good
choices, I’m responsible and I’m important to the people who care about me
because I’m able to be there for them. Unfortunately, I have often made the
choice not to be clean and sober.
I—to be honest, Judge, I don’t know what it’s going to take for me to
make that happen permanently in my life. I’m seriously hoping that this is it. I
look at my life and what I’ve done to date and it’s a pretty serious disappointment.
This isn’t all I want in my life.
So that being said, I just hope that the Court will see I do have potential
and I do have determination to do different than what I have.
Thank you, Your Honor.
(Tr., p.230, L.10–p.231, L.5; see also PSI, p.19.) Going forward, Mr. Ritchie wants to get on top
of his addiction so that he can focus on dealing with his mental health problems and reunite with
his family. (PSI, p.19.) He has participated in some counseling in the past for depression and
anger issues, but understands that he needs more counseling. (PSI, p.21.) In light of these
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mitigating factors, the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him to twenty years, with
five years fixed.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Ritchie respectfully asks that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
remand for a new trial. Alternatively, he requests that this Court order that the district court
retain jurisdiction over him or reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 4th day of December, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
MAYA P. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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